French nuclear deterrence cannot be shared. Only France must be able to decide, in full autonomy and full sovereignty, on the use of our nuclear arsenal. It is an inviolable and nonānegotiable principle. Any violation of our national territory and vital interests must be punished in proportion to the threat, by a unilateral decision of the President of the Republic; likewise, only the President determines exactly what our vital interests are and the precise degree of the threat.
At the same time, Franceās vital interests are not limited to the hexagonal framework. This has been a constant since the very origin of French nuclear deterrence: General de Gaulle already said in 1964 that āFrance must feel threatened as soon as the territories of Federal Germany and the Benelux are violated.ā It has been a constant assumed by all our leaders since then; its visionary character is perfectly demonstrated by current European and international events.
It is this set of vague modalities that underpins French strategic ambiguity. And it is on this strategic ambiguity that nuclear deterrence rests, the keystone of our military apparatus.
Emmanuel Macronās announcements, who wishes to station nuclear missiles in Europe without ceding or sharing control, do not appear to violate the fundamentals of our nuclear deterrence doctrine. This idea resembles the already effective reality of our ballisticāmissile submarines: a projection of our French power beyond our borders. Likewise, the participation of our European allies in military exercises involving nuclear strike simulations strengthens our role as a strategic leader in defense in Europe.
Our army has remained a major asset. It is an opportunity to support a resurgence of French influence in Europe and the world on one of the few elements of our power and credibility that Emmanuel Macron has not degraded. The world is becoming unstable and dangerous again; France and Europe must be able to defend themselves alone, with allies, but without depending on them.
It is therefore imperative to strengthen European preference in defense, to reinforce our defense industrial and technological base and increase our production capacities. Our security is played beyond our borders. All of Franceās history demonstrates this.
If I firmly oppose the emergence of a coādecision principle in the use of our nuclear force, I can only encourage France to occupy its place in the security of our continent: the first.
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Translated from French, view original
