Rule of Law Check: Making Sure EU Money Goes to the Right Places

European Parliament resolution on the rule‑of‑law conditionality regime (18 Dec 2025)

The Parliament reaffirms that the EU is built on human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law. It stresses that the 2020 Conditionality Regulation (Reg. 2020/2092) is a key tool for protecting the EU budget when a Member State breaches these values. The Regulation gives the Commission the power to suspend EU funds if a rule‑of‑law breach poses a “serious risk” to the budget. To date the Commission has applied it only to Hungary; it has only requested further information from Poland.

Key problems identified:

• Slow, opaque use of the Regulation. The Commission only triggered it once, despite multiple reports of breaches (e.g., in Hungary, Slovakia, Poland). Decisions are often delayed, lack clear reasoning, and can be influenced by political bargaining.
• Limited coordination with other rule‑of‑law tools. The Regulation is used as a “last‑resort” instrument, while other instruments (Article 6 of the Financial Regulation, the Common Provisions Regulation, the Recovery & Resilience Facility “super‑milestones”, etc.) are not consistently applied. This fragmentation makes it hard for Parliament to hold the Commission accountable.
• Insufficient protection for recipients. EU funds are frozen for whole programmes, but final beneficiaries (local authorities, SMEs, civil‑society groups) are not guaranteed to receive the money they were already promised. The Commission has no systematic way of checking that commitments to recipients are honoured after a suspension.
• Weak whistle‑blower and complaint mechanisms. The Commission’s complaint form is rarely used; there is no secure, confidential portal. This discourages reporting of breaches and makes back‑sliding easier.
• Unclear proportionality and risk assessment. The Commission does not publish the methodology it uses to calculate the link between a breach and a budget risk, nor does it show how it decides the amount to suspend.
• Draft 2028‑2034 Multi‑annual Financial Framework (MFF) raises new risks. The NRPP proposal adds horizontal rule‑of‑law conditions that overlap the Conditionality Regulation, potentially creating a fragmented system and giving the Council the sole power to trigger measures, while Parliament’s role is only ex‑post.

Recommendations to the Commission, Council and Member States

1. Apply the Conditionality Regulation consistently to all EU programmes, not just the big structural funds, and use it earlier (partial suspensions) rather than waiting for full breaches.
2. Publish a transparent, step‑by‑step methodology for the proportionality test, the “sufficiently direct link” between a breach and a budget risk, and the calculation of suspended amounts.
3. Combine all rule‑of‑law tools into a single, coherent framework so that the Conditionality Regulation, Article 6, the Common Provisions Regulation and the RRF milestones are used in a coordinated way, with clear decision‑making paths.
4. Ensure final recipients and beneficiaries are protected. The Commission must continue commitments to recipients even when a suspension is in force, and it should provide a clear, publicly accessible portal for recipients to track the status of their funding.
5. Strengthen whistle‑blower protection and complaint procedures. A secure, user‑friendly portal should be created, and all complaints must be processed promptly and transparently.
6. Improve cross‑institutional coordination. The Commission should establish a joint task‑force with the European Court of Auditors, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee on Budgetary Control to share data and best practices.
7. Make Parliament a true co‑decision‑maker on conditionality measures, giving it access to all written notifications, correspondence with Member States, and detailed risk reports.
8. Clarify the role of the MFF 2028‑2034 proposals. Overlapping tools must be removed, and the NRPP must be limited to funding that actually meets the rule‑of‑law condition, with no discretionary reallocation by the Commission.
9. Monitor back‑sliding and re‑investigate after measures are lifted. The Commission should conduct on‑site audits and keep a public record of any reversal of reforms.
10. Allocate resources for national anti‑corruption and investigative bodies to reduce the risk of funds being siphoned by oligarchic structures.

The Parliament calls on the Commission to submit this resolution to the Council, the Court of Auditors, the Court of Justice and all Member State governments and parliaments, urging swift and transparent implementation of the rule‑of‑law conditionality regime.